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WE ALL KNOW IT'S A KNOCK-OFF!
RE-EVALUATING THE NEED FOR THE POST-SALE CONFUSION
DOCTRINE IN TRADEMARK LAW

Connie Davis Powell*
Counterfeit luxury goods have become an undeniable part of the
global economy. It is estimated that these goods account for
roughly seven percent of the global marketplace. With the
emergence of the counterfeit market, consumers have become
sophisticated shoppers who are knowledgeable and educated
about their brand preferences as well as the availability of
counterfeits, replicas and knock-off luxury goods.
Indeed,
research suggests that consumers are eager to purchase
unauthenticproducts to gain status, without the cost. To combat
this trade, trademark holders have sought infringement actions
against the purveyors of counterfeit goods alleging post-sale
confusion. Post-sale confusion provides a basis for finding a
likelihood of confusion where the purchaser is aware that the
product is fake, but the general consuming public may believe the
counterfeit article to be a legitimate good. This Article evaluates
whether the post-sale confusion doctrine is a legitimate expansion
of trademark law and argues that such a doctrine is no longer
necessary in a sophisticatedmarketplace where other remedies are
available to curtail the trade in counterfeit goods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Canal Street' exists almost everywhere.

Whether at a mall

Professor Powell is an Associate Professor, Baylor University School of
Law; J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law, B.A., University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. Professor Powell would like to thank her research
assistants Jessica Edwards, Chantesia Hodges, and Sara McMullen for their
work on this project and Tyrone Nichols for his engaging dialogue.
' Canal Street is the infamous street located in New York's Chinatown known
for the availability of replica bags, watches, and other high-end goods. See
Christine Hauser, City Agents Shut Down 32 Vendors of Fake Items, N.Y.
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kiosk, at a street vendor, at a flea market, or on the Internet,
vendors are making available to many consumers what they
desire-counterfeit luxury goods.2 Many consumers are eager to
obtain replicas of well-known designer products. These purchasers
are neither deceived nor preyed upon-they are bargain-hunting,
savvy consumers interested in achieving their desired social
status. 3 However, such savvy consumers are not the focal point of
the post-sale trademark confusion doctrine.' Rather, the post-sale
trademark confusion doctrine targets a hypothetical, nonpurchasing consumer that might be deceived by the consumer
accomplices-the purchasers of counterfeit goods.' Post-sale
trademark confusion provides a remedy to the trademark holder
when an inferior product bears a mark that is identical or
confusingly similar to the trademark holder's mark, which has the
potential to diminish the reputation of the trademark holder's brand
by potentially confusing a non-purchaser that the inferior product
belongs to the trademark holder.' Indeed, much like traditional
Feb. 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/27/nyregion/27chinato
wn.html?_r-0.
2 Luxury goods are goods that are expensive and associated with a highprestige designer. See Arghavan Nia & Judith Lynne Zaichkowsky, Do
Counterfeits Devalue the Ownership of Luxury Brands?, 9 J. PROD. & BRAND
MGMT. 485, 485-86 (2000). The traditional definition of luxury goods defines
these commodities as status goods-goods for which the mere use or display of
the good conveys prestige upon the owner apart from any functionality or utility.
Id. The mere use or display of a particular branded product brings prestige on
the owner, apart from any functional utility. Id.
3 See Keith Wilcox et al., Why Do Consumers Buy Counterfeit Luxury
Brands?, 46 J. MKTG. RES. 247,255 (2009).
4 See U.S. v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that post-sale confusion refers to the mistaken belief of potential consumers that
a product is that of the trademark holder); see also Payless Shoesource, Inc. v.
Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 988-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (commenting that
post-sale confusion is found when a potential consumer is likely to associate the
product with the trademark of another).
5 See Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark
Law, 98 VA. L. Riv. 67, 102 (2012).
6 See, e.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d
539, 552 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that post-sale confusion is appropriate when
inferior products have the potential to damage one's reputation in the
TIMES,
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trademark confusion,' post-sale confusion analysis must take into
consideration the sophistication of the marketplace as well as the
potential purchaser of the goods and services being counterfeited.'
As such, when evaluating the likelihood of post-sale confusion, the
focus initially is on the ordinary or reasonably prudent consumer.'
However, in identifying the ordinary or reasonably prudent
consumer, it is imperative to look to the degree of consumer care
and the consumer's relative sophistication.'o If a consumer can be
expected to exercise a high degree of care in the purchasing
decision and is determined to be of above average sophistication,
the likelihood of confusion is diminished."
In a society where counterfeits are not only sought out by
consumers, but also recognized by the sophisticated shopper, it is
important to re-evaluate trademark doctrine to ensure that it has not
been expanded beyond its core policy principles. Research
conducted by social scientists suggests that consumers are indeed
aware of counterfeit goods and seek them out for a variety of
reasons, ranging from price to status associated with the luxury
brand. 2 This Article argues that the post-sale confusion doctrine is
unnecessary in a sophisticated marketplace and is not aligned with
marketplace).
7 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:95 (4th ed. 1994).
8 Forum Corp. of N. Am. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 442 (7th Cir. 1990).
9 Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 461 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he
pertinent question is whether numerous ordinary prudent purchasers would
likely be misled or confused as to the source of the product in question because
of the entrance in the marketplace of [Defendants'] mark.").
'0See id.
" See Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric D. DeRosia, Trademarks,
Consumer Psychology and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575,
579 (2008) (arguing that the more sophisticated a consumer the less likely it is
that consumer confusion will occur); see also First Nat'Il Bank in Sioux Falls v.
First Nat'l Bank, S.D., 153 F.3d 885, 889-90 (8th Cir. 1998).
12 Nia & Zaichkowsky, supra note 2 at 486-87; see also Mourad Siham, The
Effect of Counterfeit on Luxury Brand Buying Behavior, In Terms of
Consumption Experience (Jan. 16, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pierre
Mend6s France University), availableat http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/does/
00/66/04/17/PDF/CR_2011-11 _E3.pdf
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the core principles of trademark law. Purchasers of high-end
goods are less likely to be confused in the post-sale context
because of their keen awareness of their preferred brands and their
knowledge of the existence and prevalence of counterfeit luxury
goods in the marketplace.13 Moreover, trademark law was not
established to create actionable confusion in the abstract.14 It is
only when confusion is likely to persuade preferences that the law
should intervene. 5
This Article will proceed in five parts. Part II provides a
synopsis of the two core policies of trademark law: consumer
protection and protection of the goodwill of the mark. Part III
examines the development of the post-sale confusion doctrine and
identifies the principle that the courts sought to address when
adopting the doctrine. Part IV evaluates post-sale confusion in the
context of a sophisticated marketplace. Part V concludes by
arguing that the post-sale confusion doctrine is an illegitimate
expansion of trademark law and is unnecessary in a luxury goods
context where the consumers are exceedingly sophisticated.
II. POLICY OF TRADEMARK PROTECTION

Merchants have used trademarks to denote their goods and
services for thousands of years.' 6 Not surprisingly, debates
regarding the restrictions and regulations on uses of these marks
Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave, Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir.
2000).
14 See Blake Tierney, Missing the Mark: The MisplacedReliance on Intent in
Modern Trademark Law, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 229, 246 (2011)

(commenting that trademark cases are not abstract but are, and should be,
subject to precise rules).
15 See Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of "Likelihood of
Confusion": Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement,
106 Nw. U. L. REv. 1307, 1347-48 (2012) ("Confusion is not a problem in
itself ... Probability of confusion is certainly relevant to liability, but liability
should also depend on the severity of the harm that confusion is likely to
generate.").
1 See generally FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS (1925) (detailing a history of the origins of

trademark and its development).
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date back equally as far." Throughout this extensive history,
fluctuating policies and purposes have continually worked to alter
the nature of trademark law. For example, trademark law initially
developed to protect the trademark holder's interests from trade
The law then shifted its focus to consumer
diversion."
19
protection, ultimately finding a balance between the two.20 The
Lanham Act of 194621 is the first comprehensive statute that
governs both the registration and the protection of trademarks.22
The Lanham Act grants a property right to the trademark holder,
which enables the trademark holder to assert a cause of action for
any use that causes a likelihood of consumer confusion.2 3 In 1962,
Congress amended the Lanham Act by striking out language which
required confusion, mistake, or deception of "purchasers as to the
source of origin of such goods or services" to state a claim for
17

See id.

8 For a unique accounting of the development and justification of modem
trademark doctrine, see Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of
TrademarkLaw, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1839, 1860 (2007).

'9 Id.
20

21
22

at 1863.

See id. at 1866-71.

15 U.S.C. § 1051-1141 (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006).

The overall scope of the Lanham Act
invariably gets lost in the discussions about post-sale confusion and the 1962
Amendments. However, it is truly important not to lose sight of the Act as a
whole.
23 Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act defines "infringement" as follows:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant (a) use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b)
reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, or advertisements intended to
be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale offering for sale
distribution or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or to
deceive shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.
Id.
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trademark infringement.2 4 Several courts have used this expansion
to support infringement for non-purchasers in the post-sale
context.2 This Part discusses the policy behind the protection of
trademarks, the Lanham Act, and the Act's subsequent
amendment.
A. TrademarkPolicy Basics
Likelihood of confusion26 is the essential element of trademark
infringement,2 7 and over the years it has expanded significantly
from its origins.2 8 Originally, the Lanham Act protected only
purchasers that were likely to be confused or deceived about the
source of the products.29 The most significant expansion of the Act
took place with the broadening of the infringement definition
found in 1962 Amendments to the Lanham Act, which deleted
"purchasers" and "source of origin" from the definition of
infringement.30 The deletions have spurred much debate about
Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (quoting Act of October 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769, 773
(1962)).
25 See, e.g., Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 222 (1st
Cir. 1989); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir.
1987); Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 221 (5th Cir.
1985).
26 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006) (defining infringement as the unauthorized use
of a mark that is likely to cause consumer confusion).
27 The "likelihood of confusion" is determined by a multifactor test set forth
by each circuit. Compare Tana v. Dantanna's, 611 F.3d 767, 774-75 (1lth Cir.
2010), with Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc., v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867,
871 (2d Cir. 1986), and Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 385 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir.
2004). According to the Seventh Circuit, the multifactor "likelihood of
confusion" test is used "as a heuristic device to assist in determining whether
confusion exists." Sullivan, 385 F.3d at 778.
28 Deborah R. Gerhardt, The 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act Rolls Out
A Luxury Claim and A Parody Exemption, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 205, 207-08
(2007).
29 Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270,
295 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir.
24

1991)).
30 S. REP. No. 2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847,

2850-51.
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whether Congress intended to make room for types of confusion
that extended beyond the point of sale and source confusion." The
legislative history for the 1962 Amendments to the Lanham Act
states that section 17 of the bill proposed to rewrite section 32(1)

of the Act.3 2
The legislative history suggests that Congress intended to
remove the limitation of an actual purchaser to make the
"likelihood of confusion" analysis the focal point in trademark
infringement rather than the product purchase." However, many
have read the deletion of the aforementioned language by Congress
as an acknowledgment of the post-sale confusion doctrine.34 The
major argument in support of this position has been that
Congress's deletion of "purchasers" evidences its intent to expand
liability to any instance in which a likelihood of confusion could
exist." To fully understand the rationale behind this "expansion by
deletion theory" and to evaluate the legitimacy of such an
expansion to include protection of the consuming public as a
whole, it is important to begin with a brief discussion of the policy
behind protection of trademarks generally."
31 See Anne M. McCarthy, Note, The Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine: Why the
General Public Should Be Included in the Likelihood of Confusion Inquiry, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 3337, 3338 (1999).
32 S. REP. No. 2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847,
2850-51. One change is the omission of the underlined words from the
following quotation from clause (a): "on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of
origin of such goods or services." Id. (emphasis added). The purpose of the
proposed change is to coordinate the language here with that used elsewhere and
to omit the word "purchasers," since the provision actually relates to potential
purchasers as well as to actual purchasers; the word "purchasers" is eliminated
so as to avoid the possibility of misconstruction of the present language of the
statute. Id.
33 See Checkpoint, 269 F.3d at 295.
34 See McCarthy, supra note 31 at 3346-48; see also Karl Storz Endoscopy
Am., Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2002); Eldon
Indus., Inc. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 786, 820 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
3 This argument shall be referred to hereinafter as the "expansion by deletion
theory." See McCarthy, supranote 31, at 3348.
36 For an in-depth discussion of the origins of U.S. trademark law,
see Frank I.
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Contemporary trademark policy can be divided into two core
approaches: consumer protection and protection of the goodwill of
the mark." The consumer protection approach views the role of
trademark law as preventing the use of similar marks to deceive or
The goals of the
confuse consumers in the marketplace."
consumer protection approach to trademark policy are to provide
accurate information to consumers about the nature and source of
the goods and services bearing the mark, and to ensure that
consumers are not deceived as to the nature and source of the
goods and services.3 9 The goodwill approach seeks to protect the
investment in a trademark by the owner from misappropriation and
trade diversion.4 0 This approach does not focus on confusion by
consumers, but rather seeks to protect the investment of the
trademark owner.4' The protection of the goodwill developed in a
trademark is also assured in the Lanham Act by providing a
qualified property right to the owner for as long as the mark is used
in commerce to designate the source of goods and services.42 The
two approaches of trademark policy are embodied in the Lanham

Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813
(1927). See also MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 5:3.
3 See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)
("The Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in order to secure
to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of
consumers to distinguish among competing producers."); Marshall A. Leaffer,
The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 1111 (1998); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1706 (1999).
38 Lemley, supranote 37.
39 Id. (noting that the Nike sign is thought by consumers to guarantee quality
of the product).
40 Lemley, supranote 37, at 1707.
41 See S. REP No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprintedin 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1274 (stating that the purpose of the trademark statute is twofold: "to protect the
public so that it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a
particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it
asks for and [it] wants to get; and, to ensure where the owner of a trade-mark
has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats").
42 See
id.
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Act's definition of infringement.43 The Lanham Act protects the
goodwill of the trademark by providing the remedy to the
trademark holder for unauthorized use of a trademark." Likewise,
the Lanham Act guards against deception in the marketplace and
thereby protects the consumer."
William Landes and Richard Posner's article, TrademarkLaw:
An Economic Perspective,46 suggests that the consumer protection
and the goodwill approach work concurrently to create an efficient
marketplace. 47 The authors submit that trademarks, from a purely
economic perspective, lower search costs48 and provide an
incentive to the brand holder to invest monies in the brand.49
According to Landes and Posner, trademarks allow individuals to
investigate a brand and subsequently enjoy repeat purchases based
upon the use of the mark."o As such, consumers are able to "make
rational purchasing and repurchasing decisions with speed and
assurance" while simultaneously creating "incentives for firms to
create and market products of desirable qualities, particularly when
these qualities are not observable before purchase."" In addition
to the incentive to innovate, trademarks provide the trademark
holders the ability to enjoy the reputation that has been developed
in the marketplace52 while protecting the investment of the holder
by providing property rights inasmuch as the use of the trademark
by another would cause consumer confusion." Landes and Posner
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006).
See id.
45 See id.
46 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1987) [hereinafter Landes & Posner].
47 See id. at 269.
43
44

48
49

50

d
Id. at 270.

Id.
Leaffer, supra note 37, at 5-6.
52 Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 270. But see Note, Badwill, 116 HARV.
L. REv. 1845, 1851 (2003) (exploring the concept of badwill where trademark
owners are allowed to abandon or change marks that have developed a negative
reputation in the marketplace and discussing whether this practice is aligned
with the consumer protection approach to trademark policy).
5 Landes & Posner, supra note 46, at 273.
5

10
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imply that the two theories must work together to achieve the goal
of protection. 4 Indeed, the very early development of trademark
law sought to achieve this goal." Justice Clifford yielded to this
position in his dissent in Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. D.
Trainer & Sons," urging strongly that "[e]quity courts in all
civilized countries have for centuries afforded protection to trademarks, the object of such protection being not only to secure to the
individual the fruits of his skill, industry, and enterprise, but also to
protect the public against fraud."" The legislative history of the
Lanham Act illustrates how this balancing continued and explains
that the purpose of the Act is twofold: first, to protect the public
from deception in the marketplace, and second, to preserve the
goodwill and investment of the trademark holder." No doubt,
Landes and Posner's observations about the interconnectedness of
the two bodies of thought on trademark protection, which will be
termed "co-inherence,"" are valid. However, this idea of co54 See id. at 265 (stating that the article is not meant to be normative, but
rather positive). Commentators have instead viewed Trademark: An Economic
Prospective as narrowing the normative nature of trademark law to search costs.
See, e.g., Chad J. Doellinger, A New Theory of Trademarks, 111 PENN ST. L.
REv. 823, 833 (2007) (commenting that rather than account for the normative
depth of trademark law, the economic approach has stripped away much of that
depth and reduced all of trademark philosophy to a single principle: reducing
consumer search costs). However, when one reviews the foundations upon
which the article is written, Landes and Posner are seeking to explain in purely
economic terms the co-inherence of the two principles on which trademark law
rests. While the use of the economic paradigm may seemingly over-simplify the
dynamic concepts that are embodied in trademark protection, it is economic
motivators that bind the two policies-consumer protection and goodwilltogether. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 46.
McKenna, supra note 18, at 1844.
16 101 U.S. 51 (1879).
7
Id. at 57.
58 S. REP No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1274.
5
"Co-inherence" is a term coined by Charles Williams in his theological
writings discussing the trinity. ALICE MARY HATFIELD, CHARLES WILLIAMS:
AN EXPLORATION OF His LIFE AND WORK 174 (1983). While the term "coinherence" is used most often to describe the spiritual relationship between
humans and the divine, the concept is much broader-indicating an essential
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inherence of the two core principles of trademark law is often lost
in practice and policy development by the courts, with courts
favoring one principle over the other to justify a particular
outcome.60 For instance, in Sullivan v. CBS Corp., 6 the Seventh
Circuit's decision to rule in favor of the popular reality television
series was based solely upon the consumer protection approach.6 2
The court found that CBS's use of the mark "Survivor" for the sale
of a soundtrack featuring a compilation of original music from the
television series did not infringe the "Survivor" trademark owned
by Frank Sullivan used in connection with his pop music band.
The court relied heavily on Sullivan's failure to submit evidence
Indeed, the court acknowledged the
on consumer confusion.'
validity of Sullivan's mark and its unique character as it related to
music, but maintained that there was no likelihood of consumer
confusion with regard to music from the television series and that
of the 1980's pop band.6 5
relationship between things that maintain inherent components of the other. Id
This definition will be used throughout this Article to suggest an
interconnectedness between the two core principles of trademark-consumer
protection and goodwill-where they do not serve as independent rationales for
trademark law, but rather work together in ways that cannot be isolated without
fundamentally flawed protection results. This Article argues that this separation
produced the extremely flawed theory of post-sale confusion.
60 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992)
("[T]he Act's purpose [was] to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of
his business."); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916)
("The redress that is accorded in trademark cases is based upon the party's right
to be protected in the good will of a trade or business."); Trainer, 101 U.S. 52,
56-57 (1879) (Clifford, J., dissenting) ("They are used in order that such
products, manufactures or merchandise may be known as belonging to the
owner of the symbol or device, and that he may secure the profits from its
reputation or superiority."). But see Saxlehner v. Nielsen, 179 U.S. 43, 45
(1900) (finding infringement because a casual purchaser would easily mistake
the brands); Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 467 (1893) (explaining
that confusion must be present to find liability).
662 385 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 779.
63 Id.

SId.
65 Id.
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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in EntrepreneurMedia v. Smith66
aligned its decision with the consumer protection approach, even
after opining that consumers would use a higher degree of care in
selecting the services of the defendant."7 The Ninth Circuit found
that the use of EntrepreneurIllustratedfor a magazine title would
indeed lead to consumer confusion with the plaintiffs mark.68
However, the Tenth Circuit in Sally Beauty Company, Inc. v.
Beautyco, Inc."9 favored the goodwill approach to trademark
protection and found that while the marks were arguably dissimilar
("Generic Value" versus "Generix"), the defendant's intent in
adopting the mark presented an issue of fact sufficient to withstand
summary judgment.o The court found that the dissimilarities
between the marks were not dispositive in the infringement
analysis; indeed, the court considered the bad faith in adoption as
trading on the goodwill of the plaintiffs brand." The policy of
favoring goodwill investment over consumer confusion is
overwhelmingly apparent in the expansion by deletion theory,
which argues that Congress sought to protect the goodwill of the
brand by affording protections to the trademark holder, even
without a purchase by the consumer.72
Under this theory,
trademark infringements shifted from consumer protection to
protection of the goodwill.
When applied, the expansion by
deletion theory has led to a number of types of actionable
confusion74 that, when viewed critically, focus on the protection of
the trademark owner's investment in the mark."
66

67

279 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2002).
See id at 1152.

68 Id.
69
70

304 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 976.

SId.

McCarthy, supra note 31, at 3348-49.
Id. at 3349.
74 Examples of such types of actionable confusion that have been accepted
based upon the expansion by deletion theory include initial interest confusion,
sponsorship confusion, and post-sale confusion. Id. at 3349-52.
7 See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1062 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[E]ven where people realize, immediately upon accessing
72

3

FALL 2012]

Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine

13

While courts deciding trademark infringement cases purport to
evaluate each case using the appropriate standard, the courts'
review is nonetheless channeled through either the goodwill or
consumer protection approach.76 The trend of favoring the
goodwill approach or the consumer protection approach is at odds
with the goals of the Lanham Act. Indeed, the 1962 Amendments
sought to unify the two goals of trademark protection rather than
favoring one goal over the other.
B. The Keystone: Likelihood of Confusion Test
The 1962 Amendments to the Lanham Act validated the
principles of consumer protectionism and owner goodwill by
expanding "confusion" beyond the point of purchase of a good or
service." This expansion embraces "co-inherence" by protecting
the unwitting consumer that may be confused prior to purchase,
while simultaneously providing a remedy that considers the
goodwill investment of the trademark owner."
As discussed
above, the 1962 Amendments put the focal point of an
infringement action on the likelihood of consumer confusion, and
thus on the psychology of the ordinary and prudent consumer. 9 As
such, trademark owners have advanced, and courts have widely
accepted, that actionable trademark infringement includes (1) any
use of a mark (2) that is identical to, or confusingly similar to, a
registered trademark such that it (3) is likely to cause confusion
'moviebuff.com,' that they have reached a site operated by West Coast and
wholly unrelated to Brookfield, West Coast will still have gained a customer by
appropriating the goodwill that Brookfield has developed in its 'MovieBuff
mark."); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867,
872-73 (2d Cir. 1986); McCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:7; see also Network
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1146-47 (9th
Cir. 2011).
76 See McCarthy, supra note 31, at 3337.
77
Id. at 3354.
7
1 Id. at 3355-56.
79Kevin H. Josel, New Wine in Old Bottles: The Protection of France's Wine
Classification System Beyond Its Borders, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 471, 486 (1994)
("Unlike patent law, where the relevant survey population would consist only of
experts, or persons skilled in the particular art, trademark law focuses on the
associations made by ordinary, reasonably prudent consumers of the product.").
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and (4) would injure the mark owner." These two conceptsgoodwill and consumer protection-are embodied in the
"likelihood of confusion test"" developed by the Second Circuit in
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.82 In order to
determine the likelihood of consumer confusion, according to the
court in Polaroid,the following factors are considered: (1) the
strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the similarity of plaintiffs and
defendant's marks; (3) the competitive proximity of the products;
(4) the likelihood that plaintiff will "bridge the gap" and offer a
product like defendant's; (5) actual confusion between products;
(6) good faith on the defendant's part; (7) the quality of defendant's
product; and (8) the sophistication of buyers.13
While the above-listed factors are used to determine
"likelihood of confusion," the Polaroidcourt noted that no one
factor is dispositive, but rather the factors are balanced on the
whole.8 4 Following this decision, each circuit has adopted its own
likelihood of confusion test necessitating a finding of a "likelihood
of confusion" in order to establish infringement under the Lanham

80 See Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d
Cir. 1971) ("Congress eliminated the italicized, qualifying language, thereby
evincing a clear purpose to outlaw the use of trademarks which are likely to
cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor
simply as to source of origin."); see also Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods.
Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 1985) (viewing the 1962 amendment as
"allow[ing] any kind of confusion in support of a trademark infringement
action"); Boston Prof I Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg. Inc., 510
F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[T]he act was amended to eliminate the
source of origin as being the only focal point of confusion.").
8' In determining whether there is trademark infringement, courts have
employed a multifactor test to determine whether the defendant's use is likely to
cause confusion or to cause mistake or to deceive. See, e.g., R&B, Inc. v. Needa
Parts Mfg. Inc., 50 F. App'x. 519, 525 (3d Cir. 2002); Downing v. Abercrombie
& Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
82 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
83

Id

See id.; see also Natural Organics, Inc. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 426 F.3d
576, 578 (2d Cir. 2005).
84
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Act." Each circuit has developed factors, which vary slightly from
the Polaroid factors." Accordingly, "likelihood of confusion
means a probability of confusion; it is not sufficient if confusion is
merely possible."" Indeed, it is not how closely related the
products or industries are that is determinative in the likelihood of
confusion analysis, but rather "whether confusion is created so that
an appreciable number of typical consumers will likely be
confused."" Moreover, in a scenario where the typical consumer is
sufficiently "sophisticated" to discern differences between two
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992).
See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir.
1998) (including type of trademark, identity of the retail outlets and purchasers,
advertising media used, and parody); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v.
Longhorn Steaks, Inc., 122 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir. 1997) (including type of
trademark; identity of the retail outlets and consumers; and advertising media
used); Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Aastar Mortg. Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1996)
(including similarity of the goods or services, relationship between the parties'
advertising, and classes of prospective purchasers); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v.
Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1185 (7th Cir. 1989) (including type of
trademark in issue, similarity of products, identity of retail outlets and
purchasers, and identity of the advertising media utilized); Gen. Mills, Inc. v.
Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1987) (including the type of product,
its cost, and the conditions of purchase); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747
F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (including similarity of the goods and services
the marks identify, the facilities the two parties use in their businesses, and the
advertising used by the two parties); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460,
463 (3d Cir. 1983) (including price of the goods and other factors indicative of
the care and attention expected of consumers when making a purchase, length of
time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion
arising, extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same,
relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers because of the similarity of
function); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th
85

86

Cir. 1983) (quoting list from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 729 (1938)); Frisch's

Rests., Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir.
1982) (citing list from AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (including marketing channels used
and the type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser).
8 Estee Lauder Inc. v. Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1510 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 23:2, 23:10-11 (1996)).
88 Quality Inns Int'l, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198,
210 (D. Md.
1988) (emphasis added).
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marks, the law forecloses protection for the trademark holder."
The concept of likelihood of confusion has expanded
significantly over the years and has grown to include various types
of confusion that are beyond tie scope initially advanced by the
circuit courts." While courts have maintained the tradition of
evaluating the factors of their respective circuit's likelihood of
confusion test," the judiciary frequently uses its own personal
experience in deciding whether ordinary consumers are likely to be
confused.9 2 Often, judges neglect to consider who the ordinary
consumer of the goods and services is and whether that target
consumer is likely to be confused." The result has been the
creation by the trademark holder of the fictional consumer who is
"gullible, careless, and easily deceived."94 Courts have been liberal
in assessing the characteristics of the "ordinary and prudent"
consumer, as well as the scope of confusion from which the
The
Lanham Act seeks to shield these naive purchasers."
96
can
be
expansion of consumer confusion, as previously discussed,
directly linked to courts' interpretation of the purpose behind the
89 Deborah F. Buckman, Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham
TrademarkAct, 183 A.L.R. FED. 553, § 7a (2003).
90 McKenna, supra note 18, at 1899.
91 Compare R&B, Inc. v. Needa Parts Mfg., Inc., 50 F. App'x. 519, 525 (3d
Cir. 2002), with Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007 (9th Cir.
2001), and Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1200
(11th Cir. 2001).
92 See generallyAnn Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
721 (2004) (discussing the expansion of the likelihood of confusion and the
judiciary's interpretation of the average consumer).
93 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:92.
94 Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the
Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1722 (1999).
9 Id. ("Courts have been generous in interpreting the scope of confusion from
which today's credulous purchasers must be protected. Not only must they be
shielded from confusion about the source of a product at the point of sale, they
must also be protected from after-market confusion, reverse confusion,
subliminal confusion, confusion about the possibility of sponsorship or
acquiescence, and even confusion about what confusion the law makes
actionable." (citations omitted)).
See Litman supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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1962 Amendments to the Lanham Act.97 Indeed, it was this
Amendment that seemingly validated post-sale confusion under the
expansion by deletion theory." The deletion of "purchasers" had a
considerable expansive effect resulting in the justification of postsale confusion. 99 It was advanced that because trademark law is
based upon the policy of creating an efficient marketplace'o where
observers are prospective customers, their mistaken impressions as
to origins or affiliation may have a meaningful impact on future
purchasing decisions.'0 ' As such, it was argued that post-sale
confusion was directly linked to subsequent purchasing behavior,
and post-sale damage to the reputation of a trademark owner is no
less injurious than confusion occurring exclusively at the point-ofsale.' 02 For these reasons, courts have interpreted the deletion of
the Amendment to validate the position that post-sale confusion by
non-purchasers is encompassed within the Lanham Act's
infringement provisions.10
C. Evolution ofPost-Sale Confusion
Post-sale confusion is based upon the idea that while
purchasers may not be confused at the time they purchase
counterfeit goods or goods bearing a confusingly similar mark, the
consuming public may believe that the goods are genuine and may
be unimpressed as to the quality or prestige of the original goods.' 04
9 See, e.g., Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Res.,
527 F.3d 1045, 1053 (10th Cir. 2008).
98 Post-sale confusion occurs when use of an identical or confusingly similar
trademark is likely to cause consumers other than the buyer to mistakenly
believe the product is manufactured by the original trademark holder. ACI Int'l,
Inc. v. Adidas-Salomon AG, 359 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
99 S. Rep. No. 2107 (1962), reprintedin 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2848.
1oo See S. Rep. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C. Cong. Serv.
1274, 1275 ("Trade-marks, indeed, trademarks are the essence of competition.").
'o' Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872-73
(2d Cir. 1986).
102 Karl Storz Endoscopy Am., Inc. v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 854
(9th Cir. 2002).
103 Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1991).
i0 Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 493 (S.D. Fla.
1986).
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As a result, the potential consumer is dissuaded from purchasing
the authentic goods.' 5 Indeed, once the counterfeit or deceptive
goods enter the stream of commerce, "there is no bar to confusion,
mistake, or deception occurring at some future point in time."106
The premise of post-sale confusion is not that anyone is confused
or that there is a likelihood of consumer confusion, but rather the
owner of the mark may lose sales due to inferior products in the
marketplace or the reduction of the product's prestige.'
Post-sale confusion was first explored in Mastercrafters Clock
& Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc.,
in an unfair competition claim, not on trademark theory.' Here, a
competitor produced knock-offs of the prestigious atmospheric
clock manufactured by Vacheron.'09 The court in Mastercrafters
recognized that the loss of potential customers or reputation from
the marketing of an inferior substitute would be actionable as
unfair competition under common law."0
Post-sale confusion theory under the common law doctrine of
unfair competition was overruled by the Supreme Court in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stifel Co."' The Court in Sears evaluated the
doctrine of post-sale under patent law and copyright law." 2 Justice
Black, expressing the view of eight members of the Court, stated
that, while a state may require that "precautionary steps be taken to
prevent customers from being misled as to the source" of products,
it cannot prevent the copying of unpatentable articles because to do
so would conflict with the federal patent laws."' As a result, postsale confusion doctrine did not proceed as a part of a theory of
unfair competition, but rather took root as a trademark theory." 4
-os1d.
at 495.
Id. at 493.
107 Saks & Co. v. Hill, 843 F. Supp. 620,
624 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
108 221 F.2d 464, 467 (2d
Cir. 1955).
' 09 Id. at 465.
"OId. at 466.
"' 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
112 Id.
"13

"

Id

McCarthy, supra note 31, at 3351-52.

Justice Black's emphasis on
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As discussed above,"' the 1962 Amendments to Lanham Act
arguably opened trademark law to this misplaced doctrine.
Congress expressed its intent behind the Lanham Act to create a
cause of action for deceptive and misleading use of trademarks,
fraud, and unfair competition."' Based upon the amendments and
the expressed intent of Congress, courts began to broadly interpret
the scope of the Lanham Act to include post-sale confusion.
The first major case that addressed post-sale confusion after the
1962 Amendment of the Lanham Act was Syntex Laboratories v.
Norwich Pharmacal Co."' Although Syntex did not use the
specific words "post-sale confusion," it broadened the scope of
protection beyond ultimate purchasers."'
After Syntex, other cases began to acknowledge the post-sale
confusion doctrine."' Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc. set the
stage for wholesale adoption of the post-sale confusion doctrine by
the courts.'20 In Blue Bell, Levi sued Wrangler, a competing
manufacturer of blue jean pants, for infringing its pocket tab
property rights in Sears makes it important to note that both Mastercraftersand
Sears were not argued as trademark infringement cases, as neither party had
secured trademark protection for the products in question. See Sears, 376 U.S.
at 229-30; Mastercrafters,221 F.2d at 465.
115 See supra Part II and accompanying
text.
116 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (2006). The statute
states:
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of
Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks
in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from
interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in
such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception
in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or
colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies
stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names,
and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign
nations.
Id.

"' 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971).
118

Id.

See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1979).
120 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822
(9th Cir. 1980).
19
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trademark.12 ' Adopted in 1936, this pocket tab trademark consisted
of "a folded ribbon sewn with its ends captured in the seam of a
rear patch pocket."1 22 The court noted that one purpose of the
pocket tab was to be "a permanent identifier and advertisement
visible while the pants were being worn." 23 The court's decision
in the case relied heavily upon the fact that "billboards and other
point of sale materials are removed by the purchaser and have no
confusion-obviating effect when the pants are worn."l24
Wrangler's use of a similar label, the court concluded, was "likely
to cause confusion among prospective purchasers who carry even
an imperfect recollection of Strauss's Levi's mark and who
observe Wrangler's projecting label after the point of sale."I 25 The
Levi court did not reference any cases in support of the theory of

post-sale confusion.126
Notwithstanding the lack of precedence or an opinion written
to guide the development, Blue Bell became authority for what was
to become the leading case on post-sale confusion, Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A. Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.127 The win for Levi
Strauss in Blue Bell provided the company with the confidence to
press the courts to further develop the theory upon which its
victory rested, and as such Lois Sportswear became the first major
case to articulate the post-sale confusion doctrine.128
In Lois Sportswear, Levi Strauss instituted a trademark
infringement action against Lois Sportswear for the production of
jeans that bore a similar pocket pattern to its federally-registered
pocket stitch.129 In deciding the case, the Second Circuit stated that
there were two types of confusion that can be caused by Lois' use
121
22

1
123

Id. at 817.
Id. at 818.
id

24

Id. at 822.
Id. (emphasis added).
6id.
127 799 F.2d 867, 873 (2d
Cir. 1986).
128 Id. Considering that the post-sale confusion
doctrine developed out of one
trademark owner's successful win in dicta, it is no wonder it has emerged as an
increasingly trademark owner-centered rule.
1

125

I2

129id
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The first, "the likelihood that jeans
of Levi's stitching pattern.'
consumers will be confused as to the relationship between
appellants and appellee;" and the second, "the likelihood that
consumers will be confused as to the source of appellants' jeans
when the jeans are observed in the post-sale context.""' In order to
assess whether post-sale confusion existed in Lois Sportswear, the
court stated that the "Polaroidfactors'32 must be applied with an
eye towards post-sale confusion also.""' The Second Circuit held
that while Lois Sportswear's trade dress would distinguish its
product from Levi's at the point of sale, there was nevertheless a
possibility that after the sale, consumers may view the defendant's
jeans and mistakenly associate the jeans with those produced by
Levi.'34
After Lois Sportswear, the post-sale doctrine spread quickly to
other circuits."' Courts relied on the rationale presented in Lois
Sportswear and the 1962 Amendments to the Lanham Act as
justification to expand the doctrine of post-sale confusion.' 6 For
example, in FerrariS.P.A. v. Roberts,' 7 the court stated:

'

30

Id. at 871.

872-73 ("[T]his post-sale confusion would involve consumers seeing
[Lois'] jeans outside of the retail store, perhaps being worn by a passer-by. The
confusion the Act seeks to prevent in this context is that a consumer seeing the
familiar stitching pattern will associate the jeans with [Levi's] and that
association will influence his buying decision. Clearly, in this post-sale context,
the labels, most of which having been long since discarded, will be of no help."
(citations omitted)).
132 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)
(discussing factors used to determine the likelihood of confusion in the Second
Circuit).
133 Lois Sportswear, 799 F.2d at 873.
134 See id. at 877.
'3 See, e.g., Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1987)
(adopting the rationale articulated in Lois Sportswear that confusion in the postsale context is damaging to the trademark holders reputation and thusly
actionable under the Lanham Act).
136 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 23 (1992); Insty
Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1996); Payless
Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Rolex
Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Fla. 1986). These cases
131Id. at
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The Lanham Act, however, was intended to do more than protect
consumers at the point of sale. When the Lanham Act was enacted in
1946, its protection was limited to the use of marks "likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin
of such goods and services." In 1967, Congress deleted this language
and broadened the Act's protection to include the use of marks "likely
to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.""'

The court stated that Congress intended "to regulate commerce
within its control by making actionable the deceptive and
misleading use of marks in such commerce; and to protect persons
engaged in such commerce against 'unfair competition' according
to 15 U.S.C.A. Section 1127."'3 As illustrated by the discussion
of the court in Ferrari,support of the post-sale confusion doctrine
was heavily influenced by the arguments made in Blue Bell and
Lois Sportswear.'40
While some courts were eager to adopt the post-sale confusion
doctrine, other courts have recognized that some situations do not
include a significant degree of likely post-sale confusion.'"' For
example, post-sale confusion does not come into play if the mark is
employ the post-sale confusion doctrine and show how the analysis operates.
3
944 F.2d 1235, 1244 (6th Cir. 1991). "Ferrari is the world famous
designer and manufacturer of racing automobiles and upscale cars. Between
1969 and 1973, Ferrari produced the 365 GTB/4 Daytona" and the Daytona
Spyder. Id. at 1237. Ferrari also produced a car called the Testarossa in 1984.
Id. at 1238. "Production of these cars is also intentionally limited to preserve
exclusivity." Id. There are waiting periods of over five years to purchase one of
these vehicles, and they sell for at least $230,000. Id. Roberts engaged in a
business that manufactures fiberglass kits that replicate the features of the
Ferrari Spyder and Testarossa automobiles. Id. He called them the "Miami
Spyder" and the "Miami Coupe." Id. Roberts sells these kits from $8,500 to
approximately $50,000. Id.
i8 Id. at 1244.
39d.

See MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:7 (collection of cases discussing postsale confusion).
141 See, e.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d
539 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing the requisite degree of post-sale confusion); U.S.
Surgical Corp. v. Orris, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Kan. 1998), aff'd sub nom. U.S.
Surgical Corp. v. Lorris, Inc., 185 F.3d 885 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Smithkline
Beckman Corp. v. Pennex Products Co., 605 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(looking at the extent of the post-sale confusion doctrine).
140
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not highly visible to third persons when the product is being
used. 14 2 Additionally, a junior user'43 prevents post-sale confusion
where it employs an adequately distinguishing mark that is
permanently attached to the junior user's products so that it cannot
be removed after sale.'44 Some cases have also declined to
consider post-sale confusion when the mark-holder's business
interests were not affected. For example, in U.S. Surgical Corp. v.
Orris Inc.,'45 the surgeons did not have a way to distinguish certain
instruments after they had been re-sterilized from the new
instruments.'4 6 In deciding that post-sale confusion did not exist in
this case, the Federal Circuit stated that "[t]he surgeons' confusion
is only relevant to the extent that it influences the hospital's
purchasing decisions."' 47 Accordingly, "[t]he circumstances here
are such that any confusion on the part of the surgeons will not
affect the hospital's purchasing decisions."'4 8 Similarly in Gibson
Guitar Co. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars,'49 the Sixth Circuit
declined to apply the post-sale confusion to a claim of
infringement made by Gibson Guitar Company.'
The court held
that post-sale confusion cannot be used as a substitute for point-ofsale confusion, particularly when there is no reputation damage to
the trademark holder. '5'
This line of cases begs two questions: (1) Precisely what
142 See Munsingwear, Inc. v. Jockey Int'l, Inc., Civ. No. 4-93-538, 1994 WL
422280 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 1994), aff'd, 39 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 1994) (deciding
that underwear, because of its inherently concealed nature, does not pose a
sufficiently great risk of post-sale confusion).
143 A "junior user" is a party that starts to use a mark that is deceptively
similar to the senior user's after the senior user starts to use its distinctive mark.
McCARTHY, supranote 7, § 26:1.
"4
L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1134 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
14' 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, aff'd sub nom. U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Lorris, Inc., 185
F.3d 885 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
146 Id. at 1203.
147 Id. at 1211.
148

id

149
50
1

423 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 552.

'5'

Id.
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confusion is being addressed in the post-sale context, and (2) how
does post-sale confusion advance trademark policy? Answering
these questions is no easy task. As will be discussed in Part III,
post-sale confusion is not about confusion at all, but rather about
the protection of the trademark owner's investment in its markthe goodwill of the trademark.15 2
III. POST-SALE CONFUSION IS NOT CONFUSION AT ALL

Post-sale confusion is a misnomer at best in the Lanham Act
context. There is no confusion at all. Rather, the post-sale
confusion is an assertion by the trademark holder that his
reputation within the market will be damaged by the presence of an
inferior product that bears a confusingly similar mark.'" Post-sale
confusion is based solely on non-deceptive transactions between
consumer and the alleged infringer.154 In the non-deceptive
transaction context, consumers are aware that the product or good
being purchased is not a good by the trademark holder at issue.'
This is the only situation to which post-sale confusion is
applicable.' 56 In the deceptive transaction, the consumers are
unaware that they are purchasing a product or good that is not the
legitimate good of the trademark holder.' This type of transaction
is actionable because there is consumer confusion.
An analysis of court decisions on the post-sale confusion is
informative. A review of the cases reveals that there are a number
of situations where courts have found post-sale confusion is not
likely or should be limited in its scope of protection.'
In these
152 See MCCARTHY,

supra note 7, § 2:16 (defining the concept of goodwill).
'53 See Michael J. Allen, The Scope of Confusion Actionable Under Federal
Trademark Law: Who Must Be Confused and When?, 26 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 321, 345 (1991).
154 See id. at 345-47 (describing the post-sale confusion doctrine and
illustrating the concept with case examples).
155 MCCARTHY, supra note
7, § 23.7.
5
6id.
'57 id

The Seventh Circuit, while recognizing the post-sale doctrine, has declined
to apply the doctrine in a manner that does not consider the potential market for
both the original goods and the defendant's goods. See, e.g., Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v.
158
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cases, courts have stated that a Lanham Act claim should be based
upon customer confusion when deciding to purchase, or not to
purchase an item, but not on confusion from viewing goods from
Some cases provided that the prospective market for the
afar.'
trademark goods must be considered when deciding if there is a
likelihood of confusion.'60 Specifically, the universe of potential
consumers must be identified.16 '
Notwithstanding the limitations, many courts have held that
post-sale confusion is within the foundation of the Lanham Act.'62
In justifying the doctrine, courts often cite to extreme examples in
advocating for post-sale confusion. These include cases dealing
with the sale of counterfeit formula to mothers whose infants are
subsequently harmed,'6 the sale of mouthwash that contains
banned ingredients," or the sale of hazardous light bulbs.16 5
However, these examples confuse post-sale with the sale and resale
of counterfeit goods. As discussed earlier in this Part, post-sale
confusion occurs when the purchaser of a good is not confused as
to the source or sponsorship at the time of purchase, but others
who later see the infringing mark are confused.'6 6 As one can
deduce, selling counterfeit toothpaste or mouthwash to
unsuspecting purchasers does not fit the definition of post-sale
confusion. If resale and post-sale were synonymous, then this
instance of third-party confusion would be a legitimate protection
of the consuming public. But, resale and post-sale are not the

Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996); Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It"
Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1231 (7th Cir. 1993).
1 See generally Nike, 6 F.3d 1225, 1231; Dorr-Oliver,94 F.3d 376, 382.
160 See Dorr-Oliver,94 F.3d
at 382.
161 See
id.
162 See supra Part II.C (discussing the development of the post-sale
confusion
doctrine).
163 See, e.g., U.S. v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485 (5th
Cir. 2002).
164 See, e.g., Warner Lambert Co. v. McCrory's Corp., 718 F. Supp.
389 (D.
N.J. 1989).
165 See Angelo Bros. v. A & H Co., No. CIV. A. 96-2507, 1996
WL 571720
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1996).
1 See MCCARTHY, supra note 7.
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same.167 Indeed, the scenario is addressed in a standard trademark
However, the
infringement likelihood of confusion test.168
remedies that are available for trademark infringement are in fact
inadequate to curtail counterfeits and protect the public at large.169
The remedies available once an infringement of a trademark is
found are limited in scope: First, the trademark owner can obtain a
permanent injunction prohibiting the infringer from using the
infringing mark or any other mark that is confusingly similar to the
trademark owner's mark.170 Second, courts can award monetary
damages to compensate the trademark owner for the
infringement.'" Third, courts have the discretion to award to the
trademark owner its attorney's fees for bringing the action.'72 The
remedies afforded for trademark infringement are those that are
typical in tort cases,'7 and they are tailored to compensate for
losses and admonish the wrongdoer.'74 Indeed, protection of the
general public from harm has most often been left to the penal
system of criminal law.'7 "
The policies of trademark law'7 6 and post-sale confusion are
like a square peg in a round hole. They simply do not fit.
See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d
270 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing different types of confusion); MCCARTHY, supra
note 7, § 23:6 (analyzing types of confusion and types of purchasers).
168 See Checkpoint Sys., 269 F.3d at 280 (exemplifying a likelihood of
confusion test and analysis in an infringement and trademark case).
169H.R. Rep. No. 98-997, at 5-6 (1984) (discussing the need for strengthening
the remedies in the Counterfeiting Act of 1984).
170 See MCCARTHY, supra note
7, § 30:1.
171 See id. § 30:57. These damages can be increased up to three
times if the
Act,
15 U.S.C.
willful.
See
Lanham
deemed
to
be
infringement
is
trademark
§ 1117(b) (discussing the availability of treble damages in an infringement
action).
172 See MCCARTHY, supra note
7, §30:99.
173 See id. § 30:1, 30:2. Trademark infringement is a tort cause
of action. See
id. § 1:12.
174 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 2
(2012).
175 See generally Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance:
The Resilience of
37 AM. CRIM. L.
of
Criminal
Punishment,
Retribution as an ArticulatedPurpose
REv. 1313 (2000).
176 In this Part, the discussion of the policies of trademark law refers to both
167
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Assuming, arguendo, that the post-sale doctrine is a legitimate
expansion of the Lanham Act's protection, in analyzing a case or
claim or issue, it must be determined whether there is a likelihood
of post-sale confusion.177 In doing so, each of the likelihood of
confusion factors must be evaluated.17 While no one factor is
dispositive in the analysis, each factor must be considered, and if a
particular factor is not applicable, the court must explain why.'7
The factors evaluated in a "likelihood of consumer confusion"
context address the aims of trademark law, protection of
consumers, and the goodwill of the trademark owner; as such, so
should the analysis of the "likelihood of post-sale confusion."'
Realistically however, when determining the likelihood of
consumer confusion in the post-sale context, the standard reduces
to this basic question: If counterfeits of the mark are permitted to
remain in the marketplace, would the mark owner lose a
substantial number of consumers?"' This question can only be
answered by a thorough and careful evaluation of the last factor in
the likelihood of confusion test, the sophistication of the consumer
and the consuming public's probability of being a potential
consumer of the trademark owner's goods.' 7
IV. LUXURY COUNTERFEITS AND POST-SALE CONFUSION IN A
SOPHISTICATED MARKET

Sophistication of consumers is but one factor in the "likelihood
the consumer protections and goodwill approach as well as the general policies
of tort law.
1 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 497 (2d Cir.
1961) (establishing the factors of the likelihood of confusion test).
178 See id. at 492 (explicating the factors for use in this line of analysis).
179 See Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 554 (10th Cir.
1998) (discussing the importance of the factors in the likelihood of confusion
analysis).
180 See MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 23:1.
181 See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 340 F. Supp.2d
415, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), af'd in part, vacated in part, 454 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.
2006).
182 See Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 497 (establishing the factors used in
this
analysis).
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This factor encompasses several
of confusion" analysis.'
considerations that are believed to influence the care consumers
devote to their purchases. 8 4 The sophisticated consumer has been
deemed by courts not to act on "impulse," but rather out of
"careful consideration of the reliability and dependability of the
manufacturer and seller of the product."' Courts have generally
considered a correlation between sophistication of the consumer
and the following: price of the purchase, the complexity of the
purchase, infrequency of the purchase, and the personal
characteristics of the purchaser, including the education, age,
gender and income of the potential purchaser."' A few courts have
suggested that where the consumer market for goods and services
is highly sophisticated, the sophistication of the consumer in the
likelihood of confusion takes precedent over other factors in the
Indeed, where the ordinary consumer is found to be
test.'
sufficiently "sophisticated" to discern the difference between
marks, trademark law does provide a protection to the trademark
complainant.'
In the context of the post-sale confusion, sophistication of the
consumer is overwhelmingly the most important.'" Because postsale confusion seeks to protect the general consuming public and
not an actual or potential purchaser, it is imperative to consider the
See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d
270, 284-85 (3d Cir. 2001) (analyzing the sophistication of the consumer
factor).
184 See Thomas R. Lee et al., Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the
Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575 (2008) (discussing theories behind
consumer psychology and the concept of sophistication).
185 See Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d
1201, 1206 (1st Cir. 1983).
186 See Lee et al., supra note 184, at 581-82 (providing a detailed discussion
of the ad hoc impressions courts have used to determine consumer
sophistication).
187 See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kyser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir. 1996)
(stating that the sophistication of the market may override other factors in the
likelihood of confusion test).
188 See MCCARTHY, supra note
7, § 23:91.
189 See Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 398-99 (2d Cir.
1995).
183
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psychology of the consuming public and the attention that a
consumer from the general public will give to a particular
purchase.'9 0 The rationale behind the post-sale doctrine is to
protect the brand holder from a loss of sales and a loss of prestige
in the marketplace.1 9' Both of these losses are dependent upon the
psychology of the consumer. 19 2 As such, an evaluation of the
consumer is not only necessary, but paramount. Notwithstanding,
there is a lack of a well-developed theory of the consumer's
What has become
perspective, behaviors or psychology.193
abundantly clear is that trademark decisions have not been
modernized to match the changed populous.'9 4
Today's consumers are armed with information and
technology.'
Savvy shoppers leverage more technology, tools,
resources, and information than ever before to inform purchasing
According to GfK Custom Research, the new
decisions.'96
generation of consumers is capable of integrating retail and online
information "when deciding how, when and where they access the
information needed to evaluate products and services, and

190 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 23:5 (addressing who needs to be confused to
qualify as post-sale confusion).
191 See Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir.
2000) (applying and discussing the post-sale doctrine).
192 See Lee et al., supra note 184, at 646-47.
193 See generally Ann Bartow, supra note 92, at 723 (2004) (asserting that
judicial interpretation has trumped the development of a standard for consumer
sophistication).
194 See generally Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law,
103 MICH. L. REv. 2020, 2042 (2005) (using the terminology to describe the
disagreement among trademark scholars). Scholarship in the area has been
marked by two positions-the "apologist" and the "restrictionist" position. Id.
at 2023-24. The apologist views the consumer as a "fool" receptive to the
smallest suggestion of a connection between marks, while the restrictionist
paints a picture of an informed consumer who is less likely to be confused
because of their experience in the marketplace. Id. at 2025.
'9 See Future Buy Shopping Innovation Study, GFK CUSTOM RESEARCH,
http://www.gfkamerica.com/sectors/consumer/futurebuy/index.en.print.html
(last
visited Oct. 2, 2012).
196

d
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ultimately make a purchase."' These consumers are not passive
purchasers who succumb to marketing ploys, but are rather highly
engaged, informed and passionate about finding the best value for
their money.'98 This consumer behavior is characteristic of
consumers making general, everyday purchasing decisions.'9 9
Luxury goods are unique, are overwhelmingly pricey, and
convey a sense of prestige to the owner of the commodity.2 00 A
study conducted in the late 1990's identified the main
characteristics of luxury brand consumers.20 ' This study identified
these consumers as being self-conscious, affluent, and in search of
goods to distinguish themselves.20 2 As such, it has been surmised
that decisions to purchase luxury goods are deliberate and
motivated by both the psychological and physical attributes of the
goods.20 3 Today's consumer purchase behavior, coupled with the
psychology associated with the purchase of luxury goods, creates
an inference that consumers in luxury goods purchases would be
even more extreme in purchasing decisions.204 This inference
directly correlates to some courts' position that when goods are
very expensive and exclusive, consumers exercise a higher degree
of care in purchasing.2 05 As such, consumer sophistication analysis
merits dispositive weight rather than the nominal mention it
receives in discussions of post-sale confusion.206

197

id .

198

See id.

199 See

id.

Wilcox et al., supra note 3, at 249.
201 Ricky Wilke & Judith L. Zaichkowsky, Brand Imitation and
Its Effects on
1999, at 9.
Nov.
HORIZONS,
Bus.
Equity,
Innovation, Competition, and Brand
200

202

id

Wilcox et al., supra note 3, at 249.
Franck Vigneron & Lester W. Johnson, A Review and a Conceptual
FrameworkofPrestige-Seeking Consumer Behavior, 1999 ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 1,
203

204

2.
205 See e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 293
(3d Cir. 1991) (stating that "consumers of very expensive goods, will be held to
a higher standard of care than others").
206 Complaint, Hermes Int'l v. Steven Stolman, Ltd., No. 03-3722 (E.D.N.Y.
July 31, 2003), 2003 WL 23883672.
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Luxury goods dominate Lanham Act cases involving post-sale
confusion.207 It is claimed that roughly seven percent of the global
market consists of counterfeit luxury goods.208 Shows such as the
Today Show, WealthTV Special Reports and BBC Watchdog have
all conducted "consumer beware segments" that educate
consumers on counterfeits in the marketplace and the risks
associated with purchasing such goods.209 Indeed, companies such
as buySAFE, Inc.2 10 and Authentics Foundation 2 11 have developed
to ensure that consumers are capable of determining whether an
item is legitimate prior to purchase.2 21 Education on counterfeits in
the marketplace is abundant and ranges from checklists on how to
avoid the purchase of counterfeits,213 to interactive websites that
allow consumers to demonstrate their counterfeit acumen.214
The general consuming public is more sophisticated than
ever.2 15 Technology and the vast amount of information readily
available to consumers prior to making purchases have created an
extremely savvy consuming public, 216 particularly those who
See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001);
Saks & Co. v. Hill, 843 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Rolex Watch U.S.A.,
Inc., v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
208 Wilcox et al., supra note
3, at 247.
209 See, e.g., WealthTV Shows Viewers How to Buy Luxury
Goods, Not
Counterfeits, WEALTHTV (June 23, 2006), http://www.wealthtv.com/releases/pr
062306.php.
210 BUYSAFE, INC., http://www.buysafe.com/ (last visited
Oct. 5, 2012).
211 AUTHENTICS FOUNDATION, http://www.authenticsfoundation.org/ (last
visited Oct 5, 2012).
207

212

id

See How to Avoid Buying Counterfeit Products, WIKlHow, http://www.wi
kihow.com/Avoid-Buying-Counterfeit-Products (last visited Aug. 14, 2012); see
also Laura T. Coffey, 10 Tips for Spotting Counterfeits, TAMPA BAY TIMES
(May 7, 2009), available at http://www.tampabay.com/features/consumer/article
998720.ece.
214 See, e.g., International Anti-counterfeiting Coalition Counterfeiting
Gallery, INT'L ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COAL., http://www.iacc.org/about-counter
feiting/counterfeit-gallery/index.php (last visited Aug. 11, 2012).
215 See GfK Custom Research, supra note 195.
216 Deborah R. Gerhardt, Social Networks and the Law: Social
Media Amplify
Consumer Investment in Trademarks, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1491 (2012) (discussing
the trend of brand holders to attract the technologically savvy consumers).
213
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purchase luxury goods. 217 The consumer is a major factor in the
post-sale confusion test, but consumer-purchasing behavior has
been neglected and not explored in many of the case discussions of
post-sale confusion.218 Studies such as those conducted by GfK
Custom Research indicate that brand holders and marketers are
well aware of the change in the degree of care consumers take with
respect to purchases, 2 19 yet the case law for post-sale confusion has
remained static.220
Rather than assessing the psychology and behavior of
consumers in the post-sale analysis, the focal point of the
discussion has become the potential of a lost sale or reputation of
the trademark holder.221 When one maintains the focus of the postsale confusion as a lost sale or reputation, it becomes even more
imperative that the consumers are identified.22 2 In order to
determine the veracity of a claim of lost sales or reputation, it is
necessary to determine whether a consumer is dissuaded from
purchase by the presence of counterfeit goods.223 Research
indicates that the purchase of counterfeit goods often results in the
consumers developing a preference of genuine luxury products.224
A study of the behavior of purchasers of counterfeit goods suggests
that these consumers experience discomfort when others recognize
their purchases as counterfeits. 225 The detection of counterfeits is
derived from the poor physical quality, materials, and slight design
differences of counterfeits, in addition to the vast amount of

See Nia & Zaichkowsky, supra note 2, at 486. Luxury goods are those that
are associated with status, prestige, or exclusivity. Id. They generally are
expensive and range from clothing and cars to accessories. Id. Some examples
include Cartier, Rolex, Tiffany, and Louis Vuitton. Id.
218 See Lee et al., supra note
184.
219 GfK Custom Research, supra
note 195.
220 See Lee et al., supra note
184.
221 See McCarthy, supranote 31, at
3366-68.
222 Id. at 3366-67.
223 Id. at 3367.
224 See Boonghee Yoo & Seung-Hee Lee, Buy Genuine
Luxury Fashion
Productsor Counterfeits?, 36 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 280, 282 (2009).
225 id
217
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information educating consumers on recognizing fake goods.226
There is a belief amongst purchasers that counterfeiting validates
the prestige of the luxury goods and thus makes the ownership of
an authentic good even more prestigious. 227 Research by Arghavan
Nia and Judith Lynne Zaichkowsky indicates that counterfeits in
the marketplace have limited effect on legitimate brands 228 and
challenges the assumption implicit in most post-sale confusion
arguments that the availability of counterfeit brands diminishes
demand for the real brands.229
Similar studies of luxury consumer behavior are not as
plentiful as those of consumers of counterfeit goods.230 However, a
few studies have attempted to characterize qualities of high-end
purchasers. 231' A study conducted by Suraj Commuri of luxury
consumer behavior has indicated that luxury good consumers
typically exhibit three behavior attitudes toward counterfeits.232
The first attitude identified in this study is flight.3 Individuals
demonstrating this behavior abandon the brand for a new brand
when the preferred brand is counterfeited. 234 The second behavior
classification is study reclamation.23 5 Consumers from this group
are loyal customers of the counterfeited brand, are defensive, and
226

id.

227

See Nia & Zaichkowsky, supra note 2 at 495.

228

Id

Id. at 494.
230
Id. at 485.
231 Id. at 486-87.
229

Note that many of the studies conducted of luxury
consumers have not been conducted within the United States but rather in Asia.
See, e.g., Santi Budiman, Analysis of Consumer Attitudes to PurchaseIntentions
of Counterfeiting Bag Product in Indonesia, 1 INT'L J. OF MGMT., ECONS. &
Soc. SCI. 1, 1-12 (2012), available at http://www.ijmess.com/volumes/volumeI-2012/issue-1-05-2012/full-1.pdf; Lingjing Zhan & Yanqun He, Understanding
Luxury Consumption in China: Consumer Perceptions of Best-known Brands,
65 J. Bus. RES. 65:10, 1452, 1452-60 (2012), availableat http://rd.springer.com
/article/10.1007/s10551-012-1394-3.
232 Suraj Commuri, The Impact of Counterfeiting on Genuine-Item
Consumers' BrandRelationships,J. MKTG., May 2009, at 86.
233 Id. at
88.
234 Id.

235

Id. at 92.
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deplore the loss of exclusivity and absence of recognition.2 36 The
last attitude is abranding.2 37 These consumers wish to be unique
and "the brand may carry high personal meaning, but neither its
identity nor the meaning is readily accessible to others."238 While
this study outlines the types of behavior, it did not truly assess
whether these behaviors and attitudes actuate in the marketplace.
While the studies of consumers of counterfeit goods and luxury
goods provide insight into the attitudes of purchasers, the
overwhelming conclusion is that consumers are savvier than ever.
V. WHY THE POST-SALE CONFUSION DOCTRINE IS
UNNECESSARY
The post-sale confusion doctrine arguably developed as a
mechanism to protect the goodwill investment of the brand holder
as well as to protect the general consuming public.239 It must be
noted that, at the time of the doctrine's advancement, unfair
competition and trademark infringement were the only
mechanisms to hold individuals accountable for counterfeiting and
trading off of the goodwill developed by trademark owners.24 0
Today, there are remedies available to redress these wrongs. These
remedies include the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984,241 the
Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996,242 and the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006.243 Indeed, these laws
filled the void that the post-sale doctrine attempted to fill. The
anti-counterfeiting statute protects the general consuming public 24
236 id

237
2 38

Id. at 93.

d
See McCarthy, supra note 31, at 3337.
240 See id at 3351 (describing how the doctrine was created in the
1950's).
24 Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178
(2006) (codified as amended at 18 USC § 2320).
242 Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104153, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 17,
18, 19, and 49 U.S.C.).
243 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat.
1730 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
244 Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act §§ 104-153.
239
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while the dilution act protects the trademark owner's goodwill.24 5
These legal advancements render an ill-placed doctrine like postsale confusion unnecessary.
A. True Protection of the General Public from Knock-offs and
Counterfeits
In response to the lack of ability of the Lanham Act to protect
and redress the potential harm to consumers, Congress addressed
criminal counterfeiting sentencing guidelines in the context of
terrorism.246 According to Congress, sales of counterfeit goods not
only cause injury to the trademark holder but to the general
consuming public.247 The operative language in the criminal
statute regarding trademarks mirrors section 32(1) of the Lanham
Act exactly.248 Congress, in drafting the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act relied on the "concepts and definitions of the Lanham Act." 24 9
As such, the goals as stated in the Lanham Act are specifically
incorporated into the Trademark Counterfeiting Act. 250 Moreover,
Congress repeatedly indicated that the Lanham Act was the
background against which the Counterfeiting Act should be
interpreted. 251 Given this legislative history, courts deciding
criminal cases have utilized cases decided under the Lanham
Act.25 2 In fact, courts have interpreted the criminal statute
Trademark Dilution Revision Act §§ 109-312.
See Jana Nicole & Checa Chong, Sentencing Luxury: The Valuation
Debate in Sentencing Traffickers of Counterfeit Luxury Goods, 77 FORDHAM. L.
REv. 1147, 1162 (2008) (discussing the development of criminal sanctions and
protection for counterfeits).
247 Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection
Act of 1996 § 1136.
248 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006).
249 H.R. REP. No. 98-997,
at 8 (1984).
250 See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(c)(e)(3)
(2006).
251 See, e.g., Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting
Legislation, 130
CONG. REC. H12076, H12078 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (stating that "no conduct
will be criminalized by this act that does not constitute trademark infringement
under the Lanham Act").
252 See, e.g., United States v. Petrosian, 126 F.3d 1232, 1234 (9th Cir. 1997)
(upholding a defendant's section 2320 conviction by relying not only on the
criminal statute's legislative history, but also on two civil Lanham Act cases,
noting that the "definition of the term 'counterfeit mark' in the Lanham Act is
245

246
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identically to the Syntex interpretation of section 32 of the Lanham
The court in United States v. Infurnari set forth
Act.253
requirements for a cause of action under the criminal counterfeit
statute:
It is the court's view that in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2320, the
government must prove that the defendant knew the mark is
counterfeit: that he knew that the mark is spurious, that it is used in
connection with trafficking in goods or services, that it is identical to or
virtually indistinguishable from another mark, and that it is likely to
cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive.254

Despite the many similarities between the Lanham and Trademark
Counterfeiting Acts, their differences merit distinction.2 55 The
differences worthy of distinction are that the counterfeiting statute
goals are to dissuade potential counterfeiters and to address the
public wrong.2 56 These goals cannot be achieved by a Lanham Act
infringement action because civil penalties are inadequate.257
Congressional legislating with respect to the public at large was for
the protection of the welfare of those that may encounter a
counterfeit good.258 Indeed, the protection of the trademark
owners' market position or reputation was not a consideration as
such claims could be addressed civilly. 259 As such, the legitimacy
of post-sale confusion in the criminal context is not as murky
nearly identical to the definition [of counterfeit mark] in Section 2320,
suggesting that Congress intended to criminalize all of the conduct for which an
individual may be civilly liable"); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2006) (defining
"counterfeit mark" in civil actions); 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining
"counterfeit").
253 See, e.g., United States v. Infurnari, 647 F. Supp. 57 (W.D.N.Y. 1986).
254
Id. at 59.
255 See, e.g., United States v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485, 488 (5th Cir.
2002)
(recognizing the District Court's holding that Lanham Act cases "should not be
used as authoritative in interpreting a criminal statute"); United States v. Giles,
213 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 2000) (declining to follow a civil case in part
because section 2320, as a criminal statute, must be construed more narrowly);
United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that
section 2320 is "narrower in scope" than the Lanham Act).
256 Torkington, 812 F.2d
at 1350.
257
258

259

id
id

d
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because the examples articulated by Congress provide the
backdrop for the extension to third parties who are not the
purchasing consumer or a potential consumer.
B. True Protectionof Goodwill
Trademark dilution, unlike infringement, which primarily
considers the interests of the consumer, is trademark holderfocused rather than consumer-focused.2 60 It seeks to preserve the
value of a famous mark by prohibiting use of a mark that's similar
or same by third parties.26 1 The underlying assumption is that
unauthorized use of a famous mark without consumer confusion
can diminish the mark's value because the mark is no longer
associated with a single source.2 62 Congress centered the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act on the investment of the owner and the
commercial value of the mark itself.2 63 Indeed the Supreme Court
acknowledged the differences, stating that "[u]nlike traditional
infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are
not the product of common-law development, and are not
260 See Anne E. Kennedy, Note, From Delusion to Dilution: Proposals to
Improve ProblematicAspects of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 9 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIs. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 400 (2005).
261 Id. It is worth noting that notwithstanding Congressional intent, courts
have nonetheless inserted the idea of consumer confusion in the dilution
analysis. Compare Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir.
1999), abrogatedby Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003)
(stating that "[clonsumer confusion would undoubtedly dilute the distinctive
selling power of a trademark"), and Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v. Unger, 14 F. Supp.
2d 339, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that presence of confusion is relevant to
showing dilution), with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 805 (9th
Cir. 2002) (stating that "[d]ilution works its harm not by causing confusion in
consumers' minds regarding the source of a good or service, but by creating an
association in consumers' minds between a mark and a different good or
service").
262 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining dilution as "lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of
the famous mark and other parties; or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
deception").
263 H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
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motivated by an interest in protecting consumers."2 " Dilution on
its face appears to be the precise cause of action that advocates of
the post-sale confusion doctrine sought to enlist. However, bound
by the consumer-oriented policies, advocates stretched the bounds
of the existing law to create a cause of action where "confusion"
was remote to non-existent.26 5 The introduction of trademark
dilution and the subsequent revisions to the Trademark Dilution
Act266 changed the landscape. The Trademark Dilution Act created
a cause of action that protects the trademark owner and does not
require a finding of confusion. The arguable necessity to stretch
the trademark confusion doctrine simply does not exist in the
current legal climate.
VI. CONCLUSION

Continued acknowledgement of the post-sale confusion
doctrine obfuscates the fundamental principles of trademark. The
touchstone for liability under the Lanham Act is likelihood of
confusion.26 7 The idea that the Lanham Act can protect the general
public from "confusion" is not and has never been the goal of the
Lanham Act and is inapposite to the core policies surrounding
trademark protection. Chief Justice Holmes captured the essence
of the purpose of trademark law-to protect the consuming public
from confusion-in his dissent in Continental Wall Paper Co. v.
Lois Voight & Sons Co268.
"A man does not make conduct
otherwise lawful, unlawful simply by yearning that it should be
so.a269 Since the 1962 Amendments, courts have heard the
264

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 429 (2003). superseded

by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120
Stat. 1730, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)-(2), as recognized in Levi Strauss & Co. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011).
265 See supra Part III (discussing post-sale confusion as a misnomer).
266 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-312, 120 Stat.
1730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
267 See generally Janet S. Thomas, Comment, Likelihood
of Confusion Under
the Lanham Act: A Question of Fact, a Question of Law, or Both?, 73 KY. L.J.
235 (1984).
268 212 U.S. 227 (1909).
269 Id. at 271.
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yearning of trademark and obliged. However, the post-sale
confusion doctrine takes out of context the purpose behind the
amendments. The removal of the purchaser's language sought to
unify the idea that an actual purchase was not required. The postsale confusion analysis removes the consumer from any type of
And because the allegedly confused
purchasing decision.
consumers in the post-sale confusion context are not purchasers or
even potential purchasers of the luxury goods at issue, their
confusion cannot impact their decisions regarding the trademark
holder's goods. The doctrine defines as actionable any presence in
commerce of a good that bears a similar or identical mark without
regard to any consumer confusion.27 0 It is now time to re-evaluate
the post-sale confusion doctrine's legitimacy and necessity. The
doctrine is far removed from the intent of trademark policy and
cannot be reconciled with the policies behind trademark protection.
The post-sale confusion doctrine was an expansion made in an
attempt to address issues of unfair competition and criminal
conduct that has been addressed by subsequent legislation of
Congress.271
The traditional view of the 1962 Amendments to the Lanham
Act is overly broad. As discussed in Part II.A, the Amendments
have been interpreted to provide the basis for any form of
The purpose of the 1962
confusion in the marketplace.
Amendments, as expressed by Congress, was to ensure that the
Lanham Act was not limited to only point-of-sale confusion, "since
the provision actually relates to potential purchasers, as well as to
actual purchasers."2 72 While Congress stated that the Lanham Act
is twofold-to protect the consumers and the investment by the
mark owner 2 7-Congress specifically stated that this was the goal
of the entire statute, not simply section 32(1) of the Lanham Act.274
See McCarthy, supra note 31.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006).
272 S. Rep. No. 87-2107, at 4 (1962), reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844,
270
271

2847.

See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. t89, 197-98
(1985).
274 See generally
id.
273
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At the onset of the likelihood of confusion test, some jurisdictions
correctly limited the analysis to purchasers and potential
purchasers.2 75 This limitation by these jurisdictions was aligned
with the legislative intent behind the amendments to
section 32(1).276
A comprehensive review of the Lanham Act reveals that the
statute g6verns both the registration and the protection of
trademarks.2 77 Thus, it is important to look at the Lanham Act's
grant of a property right to the trademark holder in section 22.278
This section provides that "[r]egistration of a mark on the principal
register provided by this Act ... shall be constructive notice of the

registrant's claim of ownership thereof."279 This grant of a property
right in the mark that is used in commerce to designate source of
goods and services entitles owners to seek remedies available
under the trademark statute, as well as those available under unfair
competition and all other property remedies.280 Moreover, it is
important to point out that the Lanham Act provides the remedy to
the trademark holder.2 1' This is significant in light of the Lanham
Act's stated goals and approaches to trademark policy. While it is
true that the consumer protection approach is aimed at protecting
the potential consumers from deception, it is the owner who
enforces and receives the relief, not the consumer.282 This factor is
extremely important as it meets the stated goal of providing an
See Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1249 (6th Cir. 1991).
276 See Lisa M. Sharrock, Realigning Initial Interest Confusion with the
Lanham Act, 25 WHITTIER L. REv. 53, 57 (2003).
277 Id. at 57 ("Theoretically, the post-1962 statute permits infringement
actions premised on confusion of the general public. However, the legislative
history unambiguously indicates that the confusion to which the statute is
directed is the confusion of purchasers and potential purchasers.").
275

278

15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2006).

279

Id.

280 See Fred S. McChesney, Deception, Trademark Infringement, and the
Lanham Act: A Property-Rights Reconciliation, 78 VA. L. REV. 49 (1992)
(commenting that the Lanham Act provides a different rationale for deception
and does not displace common law causes of actions).
281 See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2006).
282

id
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incentive to the mark holder to continue investment knowing that it
has a remedy available at law.283
Trademark law by its nature cannot protect the general public.
Causes of action arising out of trademark infringement are torts,
and tort law does not serve the general public but seeks to
compensate for the injury incurred. In the case of trademark
infringement, loss of reputation and goodwill associated with the
brand is the injury seeking redress. While it is arguable that there
are deterrent aspects in trademark infringement actions, the
deterrent effects are limited for which post-sale confusion is most
often used to address-counterfeits.
Post-sale confusion for many years has been used as a
mechanism in which trademark holders sought to deter counterfeits
and knock-offs. This doctrine is ill-suited for this purpose for the
following reasons: (1) criminal laws exist today which protect the
public at large from the scurrilous practices of those that trade in
counterfeit and knock-off goods; (2) trademark law has evolved,
creating causes of action for dilution which protects the interest
necessitating the creation of post-sale confusion; and
(3) consumers are more sophisticated than ever. Under the current
analysis for post-sale confusion, sophistication of the consumer
lessens the likelihood of confusion. As such a trademark
infringement action must fail in the sophisticated marketplace,
particularly when consumers all know it is a knock-off.

283

See Landes & Posner, supra note 46.
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